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RECENT DECISIONS
would incriminate the witness in another jurisdiction, either state or federal.
People v. Den Vyl, 318 Mich. 645, 29 N. W. 2d 284 (1947); State ex rel Doran v.
Doran, 215 La. 151, 39 So. 2d 894 (1949); State ex rel Mitchell v. Kelly, Fla.
, 71 So. 2d 887, 896-97 (1954); 82 A. L. R. 1380, 1383 (1933).
These cases were cited by the majority in the instant case as authority for its
decision. Particularly relied on was the Den Vyl case, in which a witness was
allowed a privilege against self incrimination in a state proceeding on the grounds
that his testimony would incriminate him in a federal prosecution then pending
against him. But as was pointed out by the dissents in the instant case, the
privilege allowed in the Den Vyl case was that provided by the Michigan Constitution. Similarly in the other cases relied on by the majority, the privilege allowed
in each case was the constitutional privilege of the state which was conducting the
proceedings. It was never the privilege of the other jurisdiction whose prosecution
was feared. These courts have reached their desired results by construing the
state's own exemption from compulsory self incrimination to be still in force and
its application required because the imminent foreign prosecution made the
state's immunity provisions insufficient as a replacement for the ptivilege. Such
reasoning was impossible, however, in the instant case because, as admitted by the
majority, the Louisiana privilege as conditionally granted by Article 1, section 11
of the constitution, was non-existent under Article 19, section 13 in cases of
bribery investigations.
The majority opinion was perhaps motivated by a sense of fairness and
justice which would seem to be lacking in a correct result under these unique
facts, but which can not properly be avoided under present law. The only solution
to this problem of dual sovereignty would seem to lie in an overruling of the
Twining or Feldman decisions, or more probably in federal legislation granting
comity to state immunity laws.
Edward H. Coughlin
Labor Law: Constitutionality of Section 301 (a) of Taft-Hartley Act
In an action by a union for construction of a collective bargaining agreement
and enforcement of individual employees' alleged rights to unpaid wages under
the agreement, held: the action was not within the federal court's jurisdiction as
conferred by the L.M.R.A. provision that suits for violation of contracts between
an employer and a union representing employees may be brought in federal
courts without respect to amount in controversy or citizenship of parties, since
the rights sought to be enforced were uniquely personal in nature. Ass'n. of Westinghouse S. Emp. v. Westinghouse E. Corp., 348 U. S. 437 (1955).
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Petitioner brought suit in a District Court for unpaid wages on behalf of their
individual members. Jurisdiction was invoked under section 301 (a) of the TaftHartley Act, 61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 185 (1952), which provides that
suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a union may be brought
in a federal district court. Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on,
inter alia, two grounds: (1) that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject
matter; (2) that the complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be
granted. The court held that it had jurisdiction, but dismissed on the second
ground. 107 F. Supp. 692 (W. D. Pa. 1952). The Court of Appeals, sitting en
banc, vacated the order and directed dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, three
justices dissenting. 210 F. 2d 623 (3d Cir. 1954). The majority held that section
301(a) granted jurisdiction only where there had been a breach of the collective
bargaining agreement, whereas the claim here, if any, arose out of the individual
contracts of hire.
In the Supreme Court the majority felt that the section was a procedural
grant of jurisdiction, but narrowly construed the statute so as to avoid the Constitutional problems involved as to its validity. They held, therefore, that Congress
did not intend to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts in this type of action,
where the right was a uniquely personal one. These constitutional problems were:
(1) If section 301 (a) is a procedural grant of jurisdiction only, is there a federal
question involved? (2) If state substantive law is to be applied does the action
"arise under" a law of the United States, the limiting language of the Constitution
upon the federal judiciary? U. S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Conversely, if federal
law is to be applied, is it to be federal common law and has Congress created
substantive rights in section 301(a)? The majority's reasoning was supplemented
by the fact that a contrary result would greatly increase the number of cases in the
crowded federal courts. Two concurring justices expressed the opinion that the
legislative history and the language of the section were not sufficiently explicit to
show a dear intent by Congress to allow this personal type of suit, and that this
was not the time to raise constitutional questions. Mr. Justice Reed took the
position that Section 301(a) was constitutional since the subject matter of the
litigation was related to interstate commerce and would be constitutional even
though a substantial amount of state law might have to be applied. He concurred
in the result, however, because in this case the complaint failed to set forth a violation of the collective bargaining agreement, but merely violations of the individual
employment contracts. Two justices dissented. They felt that the section was
constitutional, that federal common law should be applied, and that the union had
standing to sue.
This decision casts doubt upon the validity of many prior holdings in the

RECENT DECISIONS
lower courts. The majority opinion indicates a feeling that section 301(a) is a
procedural grant only, yet many lower courts had previously ascribed to this section
the creation of substantive federal rights. United Elec. Workers v. Oliver Corp.,
205 F. 2d 376 (8th Cir. 1953); Shirley-Herman Co. v. Local 210, Int'l Hod
Carriers,182 F. 2d 806 (2d Cir. 1950). These courts had applied this substantive
federal law only where in conflict with local state law. The right of the union to
sue on the collective bargaining agreement has never been questioned when the
benefit ran directly to the union. Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, 98 F. Supp.
278 (S. D. N. Y. 1951). The instant decision not only makes it explicit that a
union may not sue in behalf of its members to enforce their individual contracts
of employment, but also casts doubt on the availability in federal courts of any
remedy at all for the breach of a collective bargaining agreement in non-diversity
cases. The holding of the majority seems to be that only suits which contain only
federal substantive questions may be brought under section 301(a).
In New York, the union has a remedy in the instant case situation. The
union is recognized as an entity and may sue or be sued as such. N. Y. GENERAL
AssoCIATION LAW, §§ 12, 13. Moreover, the union has been allowed to sue on
behalf of the employees it represents. Barth v. Addie Co., 271 N. Y. 31, 2 N. E.
2d 34 (1936), rehearing den. 271 N. Y. 615, 3 N. E. 2d 211 (1936).
As a procedural jurisdictional grant only, there is much to be said concerning
the advisability of such a device as Section 301. In many states an unincorporated
association may neither sue nor be sued. Kingsley v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters,
323 III. App. 353, 55 N. E. 2d 554 (1944). In the past, this has led to wild-cat
strikes and stoppages which might otherwise have been prevented if such a remedy
were available. Ass'n of Westinghouse S. Emp. v. Westinghouse E. Corp., 348
U. S. 437, 457. Neither employer nor union had a means of enforcing its rights;
it was to remedy this situation that Congress passed this Section. 93 Cong. Rec.
3839 (1947). Collective bargaining agreements became enforceable in a federal
court without a prerequisite showing of diversity of citizenship. To go further,
and to allow a union to sue in situations similar to the instant case would seem
to be a sensible step forward, for it is much to be doubted that any one of the
4000 employees involved in the instant case would go to court for his mere
$10-$20 each; yet in the aggregate, there was more than $45,000 involved. A
useful tool in curbing labor strife has been rejected on the ground that Congress
did not intend such a result.
Section 301 (a) might be constitutionally sustained as a procedural grant,
however, on the following line of reasoning: Congress has declared a labor policy,
in industries affecting commerce, based on the principle of collective bargaining.
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49 STAT. 449 (1935), as amended, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 151
(.1952). Failure to bargain collectively is an unfair labor practice, 29 U. S. C.
§ 158(a) (5) and is protected and enforced by the N.L.R.B. and the federal
courts. 29 U. S. C. § 160 (a), (e). As such, the agreement resulting from such
collective bargaining is a creation of the federal law; the breach of such agreement, even though governed and interpreted by state law, would be a breach of a
federally- created right, and, therefore, enforceable in federal courts. The right to
bargain collectively is a nullity without the remedy of enforcement.
If section 301 (a) were sought to be held valid on a theory of Congress'
having created new federal substantive rights in conjunction with the procedural
jurisdictional grant, two pursuasive arguments would be presented in opposition.
First, the language of the entire section and its legislative history disclose no
intent to include any such rights; 93 CONG. REC. 3839 (1947); H. R. REP. No.
245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947); and where the intent of Congress is so dearly
contrary, the court should not ignore the will of the legislature. Hopkins Federal
Savings and Loan Assn. v. Cleary, 296 U. S. 315 (1935). Second, the question of
whethet Congress had pre-empted the field and thus excluded state courts, already
in doubt, would arise with greater force. Compare Fay v. American Cystoscope
Makers, supra, with Castle & Cooke Terminals v. Local 137, 110 F. Supp. 247
(D. Hawaii 1953). In the former case, the court, in allowing removal, held that
not only had Congress created federal substantive rights, but also.had pre-empted
the field. In the latter case, however, removal was refused because the words of
the statute, "may be brought," indicated non-exclusive jurisdiction. If the ultimate
decision were that Congress had not pre-empted the field, then the evil of forumshopping would swiftly arise in those states which recognize unions as entitiesan evil recognized and sought to be eliminated in diversity cases, in Eric R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
It appears to the writer that of the two solutions, sustaining section 301(a)
as a procedural jurisdictional grant only is the more feasible and logical, consistent
with both the legislative history and the language of the statute itself. There would
be no forum-shopping, no growth of unneeded federal common law, and it would
serve to fill a vacancy left in the procedural ranks of many states, providing
enforcement where none was available previously. If the section is ultimately in
those states where the union is not recognized as an entity, and perhaps more
arbitration coverage in the collective bargaining agreement itself.
John G. Putnam, Jr.

